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This paper explores the merit of adapting a criminological framework to analyse 
international intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Governing through 
Crime (Simon 2007) is a key reference point in contemporary criminology. It has 
been adapted in analyses of the extent to which migration, anti-social behaviour and 
corruption are used to develop new forms and opportunities for governing (Bosworth 
and Guild 2008; Crawford 2009; Dorn 2009) and has been identified in the UK 
(Waiton 2009), the EU (Baker 2010), and the international system (Findlay 2008). I 
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employ Simon’s framework to examine the extent to which international actors in 
BiH govern through crime. Drawing on documentary analysis and interviews2 to 
focus on the EU and the Office of the High Representative (OHR), I explore the 
possibility of international governance of a state through crime. The paper outlines 
how Simon’s framework is adapted and applied, describes the local context of 
governance in BiH, and examines the two international bodies in turn.  
This is not a review of how international and local actors govern crime. Rather, by 
exploring particular moments of governing action I examine if and how claims of 
acting against crime may be used as a tool to govern and to secure legitimacy in a 
context where it is contested. In this enterprise I am mindful of Simon’s concern for 
democracy. Fuelling a culture of fear and control, governing through crime supports 
actions neither proximate nor proportionate to crime threats, narrows the framework 
through which governing actors interpret citizens’ needs, undermines legislative 
scrutiny and challenges core democratic values of liberty and equality (Simon 2007: 
3-7; 267). As BiH rebuilds and consolidates democracy, early steps on this path may 
have a lasting impact on longer term democratic outcomes. I find only limited 
evidence of governing through crime, which is often ambiguous or opportunistic. 
Thus while international actors have used crime scandals to pursue wider political 
objectives in BiH, this does not evidence the harmful narrowing of the governing 
framework akin to Simon’s observations in the US. I also argue that acknowledging 
and developing an implicit and reductive focus on criminal justice logics as punitive 
brings greater analytic precision to the framework, regardless of the context in which 
it is employed.  
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Simon describes the construction of ‘a new civil and political order structured around 
the problem of violent crime’ (2007: 3) in contemporary America. The risk of crime, 
specifically violent crime, serves as a structuring factor through which policy is 
conceived, implemented and legitimated, and underpins the exercise of authority. 
Three strands bring together a cluster of activities and practices that characterise 
governing through crime:  
 3 
S1. Governing actors claim to act legitimately when acting against crime as they 
act on behalf of the victim. The victim becomes a ‘symbolic citizen’, 
representing the needs of the wider public.  
S2. This legitimacy is politically attractive and is used to cover more contentious 
political goals.  
S3. ‘[T]echnologies, discourses and metaphors of crime and criminal justice’ spill-
over and are adopted in other areas of governing. 
(Simon 2007: 4-5).  
From being one social problem among many, crime becomes the dominant challenge 
and a model for understanding other problems. In America this mode of governing is 
apparent in various ways: the increasing salience of crime and punishment in 
elections; increased legislative activity around criminal justice matters; and rising 
rates of incarceration. 
Neither Simon, nor those using his analytical framework, consistently maintain the 
focus on violent crime. For example, he draws on accusations of drug use in custody 
disputes and terminations of public housing tenancies (Simon 2007: 191, 194). Baker 
does not specify the nature of the victim or quasi-victim in her analysis of the EU 
(2010: 196-199). Yet the lack of ambiguity in violence may prove central to claims to 
legitimacy when governing through crime. Boutellier’s concept of victimalisation 
(2000) stresses the importance of victims in legitimating criminal justice institutions 
and procedures. In a pluralistic society with weak markers of common identity, a 
sense of shared vulnerability provides a basis for public morality and the suffering 
victim becomes a “legitimising metaphor of criminal law” (Boutellier 2000: 15, 45). 
Boutellier draws on Braithwaite’s work, distinguishing predatory from non-predatory 
crimes. The unequivocally ‘clear damage’ of the former mobilises communities 
(Boutellier 2000: 46). This is equally apparent in Pratt’s analysis of narratives 
supporting populist punitiveness in New Zealand (2008: 368). In the examples 
presented in this paper, victimisation is often contested or ambiguous suggesting a 
diversion from the core of Simon’s analysis. 
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Although Simon’s focus is the internal governance of America, and the governance of 
individuals, he does suggest that this model of governing has a global reach (2007: 
265-266). I explore whether the rationalities and practices bound up in the phrase 
‘governing through crime’ can apply to the governance of recently democratised or 
post-conflict states that are prone to external governing interventions. BiH is a clear 
example of such a state and has experienced extensive and intensive international 
intervention and supervision since the end of the conflict in 1995 (e.g. Chandler 2000; 
Ebner 2004; Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005; Jeffrey 2006; [AUTHOR] 2011). The 
application of the framework in BiH requires some justification. Firstly, as noted, the 
developments traced by Simon have already been identified in modified contexts 
elsewhere, including international settings (Baker 2010; Findlay 2008). The specific 
states (Waiton 2009), regional bodies (Baker 2010) and more loosely defined 
alliances (Findlay 2008) in which this approach to governing has been identified also 
play an important role in the international governance of BiH. Further, Simon’s work 
fits into a broader set of criminological studies concerned with crises of legitimacy 
and authority (see McAra 2005: 283). Although these narratives have generally been 
developed with state authority in mind, international actors in BiH face their own 
challenges in maintaining legitimacy (Chandler 2000; Knaus and Martin 2003; 
Republika Srpska Government 2010). By looking at a specific site where international 
actors have been engaged over a period of time, this project hopes to circumvent the 
challenge inherent in Findlay’s attempt to develop an account of global governance 
through crime (2008) which employed a level of analysis whereby the ‘tangible signs 
of significant institutional integration’ were not clearly evident (Papanicolaou and 
Antonopoulos 2009: 430).  
The paper focuses primarily, but not exclusively, on the period from 2002 to 2006. 
This coincides with Paddy Ashdown’s period as High Representative, a phase of 
heightened activity on the part of OHR ([AUTHOR] 2011: 51, Fig. 2.2) and involving 
negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between BiH and 
the EU. In this period there is prima-facie evidence of external interventions drawing 
on crime-based legitimations: the High Representative highlights criminal activity in 
various policy sectors while pursuing reform; EU officials highlight crime risks 
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presented by BiH to the EU; police reconstruction features, sometimes as a stumbling 
block, in pre-accession negotiations with the EU. This paper looks at these in greater 
detail and examines a wider set of policy areas for evidence of governing through 
crime.  
The project required a conceptual leap: Simon focuses on crime and the regulation of 
‘the self-governing activity of people’ (2007: 16, emphasis added); While governing 
is still taken as action structuring others’ fields of possible action (Foucault, 2000: 
341), the target is a state rather than the citizen and that state’s conduct in relation to 
its own citizens and other states. The state is understood as a ‘centre of the exercise of 
political power’ (Poulantzas 1973: 115) through its function of organising and 
providing a framework for a number of institutions. However Burke-White’s plea to 
disaggregate the state analytically (2005: 564) is central given the fragmentation of 
BiH described below. This allows the exploration of contradictory interests and 
actions and makes visible the interaction of international governing action with the 
domestic political contestation that is a strong feature of post-conflict states. The 
conceptual leap is not so big given that Simon uses governing through crime to 
explain the restructuring of the US state (2007, especially chapter 2); likewise, Baker 
uses Simon’s framework to examine shifts in power between the Commission, 
Council and member states of the EU (2010: 203 ff). I propose three aspects of 
governing states through external intervention, of which the second two, G2 and G3, 
particularly inform my subsequent analysis3:  
G1. Actions structuring, limiting or encouraging particular actions, or ways of 
acting, upon its own citizens, by a state.  
G2. Actions structuring relations within a state, between, for example, central and 
sub-national units of government.  
G3. Actions structuring a state’s interactions with other states.  
Governing actions may cut across these categories. For example, the European 
Commission sought one state-level ministry which could act as sole interlocutor on 
internal security in place of two entity-level governments, ten cantonal-level 
governments and the government of Brko District. This attempt to shape the way in 
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which BiH relates to the EU (G3, above) also affects relationships between state-level 
and sub-state government in BiH (G2).  
Simon’s objectives are partly polemical and normative (2007: 4, 6), his examples are 
open to argument, and his assertions can be ‘difficult to test decisively’ (2007: 5). 
Where he draws out indicators of governing through crime, many are difficult to 
transpose onto the context of international actors. From the three strands of governing 
through crime identified earlier (S1-S3), I develop corresponding hypotheses of how 
governing through crime might manifest itself in an international context.  
H1. If action against crime is seen as legitimate, international agencies will 
emphasise activities undertaken against crime to secure legitimacy.  
H2. If acting against crime masks and legitimates action pursuing more 
contentious ends, international agencies will link controversial policy goals to 
crime risks.  
H3. If crime is a model problem and criminal justice provides model solutions, a 
punitive criminal justice model will be evident in non-criminal justice contexts 
and policy problems will be cast in terms of crime. Punitive approaches will 
be taken to non-compliance among state-actors.  
In what follows, I sketch out the domestic and international governing arrangements 
in BiH, before going on to analyse interventions on the part of the EU and OHR. 
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The Bosnian constitution was established as part of a wider peace settlement (GFAP 
1995) which gave certain powers to state-level institutions, but reserved most, 
including defence, policing and justice, for two entities: the unitary Republika Srpska 
(RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), itself divided into ten 
cantons. Post-war arbitration between the entities created a further special district in 
Brko (Jeffrey 2006). The result is a complex of governments made up of 147 
ministries, around one for every 23,000 to 29,000 people ([AUTHOR] 2011: 45). 
Antagonism and competition exist over competence, most notably between RS and 
state-level governments, and between cantons and the FBiH government. Common 
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institutions at state level are described as a ‘thin roof’ (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 2005: 
577) and any ‘thickening’ of the central state in BiH4 is a source of tension.  
The settlement provided for an International High Representative to ‘facilitate the 
Parties' own efforts and to mobilise and coordinate organisations and agencies 
involved in the civilian aspects of the peace settlement’ (GFAP 1995: annex 10). This 
figure is ‘the final authority’ on interpreting civilian implementation of the peace 
settlement. The office draws its authority from the peace settlement, the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), and a Peace Implementation Council (PIC). Since 
1995, through seven High Representatives, the mandate and the way in which it is 
interpreted has shifted considerably, most notably between 1997 and 1998. The High 
Representative was initially limited to giving recommendations to domestic 
authorities (UNSC 1996). In 1997, the PIC, meeting in Bonn, welcomed High 
Representative Carlos Westendorp’s intention ‘to make binding decisions’, 
particularly where domestic parties failed to reach agreement. It was agreed that he 
may take ‘other measures to ensure the implementation of the Peace Agreement… 
[including] actions against persons holding public office’ (PIC 1997). These 
conclusions were supported in the Security Council and reaffirmed the following year 
(UNSC 1997, 1998). These ‘Bonn powers’ (see Ebner 2004) underpin decisions in 
defence reform and the removal of public officials explored below.  
The OHR coordinates mainstream agencies implementing civilian aspects of the 
peace settlement5. Further agencies cooperate closely with OHR and thus it is central 
to political decision making in BiH. The concentration of power in one body, 
unaccountable to the people of BiH and beyond the reach of conventional 
mechanisms of judicial review, is controversial (Dorn 2009: 248). Chandler has long 
been concerned over the limited role of Bosnian politicians in the legislative process, 
describing the country as ‘a parody of democratisation’ (2000: 204). His later work 
continues this theme, identifying the problematic dissociation of law from local 
political processes of consensus building (2004: 578), a tendency for international 
actors to avoid openly stating controversial policy goals (2010: 80), and to criminalise 
opposition (2004: 586). Taken together these latter concerns point in a similar, if not 
identical, direction to Simon’s concerns in the US.  
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Before examining OHR in relation to the governing through crime framework, I 
analyse EU activity. Since the peace agreement of 1995, the possibility of EU 
membership has been extended to BiH, something reinforced at Thessaloniki in 2003. 
Already a key player through contributions to the OHR, the EU has become 
increasingly important in governing BiH and the ‘pull’ of Brussels is contrasted to the 
‘push’ of the OHR’s Bonn powers (Commission of the European Communities 2003: 
11). Internationally-sponsored reform in the field of criminal justice has been 
intensive and extensive, including major overhauls of personnel in policing and 
courts, new police institutions established at the state level, involving new ministries, 
and a new adversarial criminal procedure ([AUTHOR] 2011). This supports a 
conclusion that there is a strong emphasis on crime and criminal justice amongst the 
international community, but this in itself is not enough to support a claim that they 
govern through crime. The following section takes a more detailed look at whether the 
EU seeks to take advantage of the legitimating function of action against crime. Four 
areas are explored: the EU Police Mission (EUPM); the EU military force (EUFOR); 
pre-accession processes; and functional reviews of government. 
#	&	'			
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The EUPM monitors police in BiH, with the objective of establishing ‘a sustainable, 
professional and multiethnic police service operating in accordance with best 
European and international standards’ (EUPM 2008). The mission enjoys a high 
profile, participates in regular press briefings in BiH, produces a regular newsletter, 
and was the subject of press features outside BiH, particularly when its mandate 
began or was renewed. This alone is not evidence of a disproportionate focus on 
crime and criminal justice and so needs to be placed in the context of a wider range of 
EU activities.  
	
The EUFOR military mission succeeds those of NATO and the UN (see UNSC 1995, 
1996, 2004) and aims to contribute to a safe and secure environment and to prevent a 
resumption of violence (EUFOR undated). Although all missions were authorised in 
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terms of the military annexes of the Dayton Peace Agreement, EUFOR has 
undertaken crime-oriented activities including pursuing and detaining persons 
indicted for war crimes (PIFWCs), confiscating illegal weapons and targeting 
organised crime, including smuggling and illegal logging. If acting against crime is a 
privileged source of legitimacy, H1 suggests EUFOR would emphasise this work.  
From 2005 to 2007, EUFOR participated in 104 joint press conferences organised by 
OHR and contributed either a prepared statement or responded to questions in 525. 
Table 1 breaks down EUFOR-specific content, highlighting crime-oriented topics. 
This shows variation from year to year: while issues around organised crime, 
terrorism, drugs and EUFOR support to police make up thirty per cent of topics 
covered in 2005, they barely feature in 2006 and not at all in 2007. Weapons harvests 
account for only eight per cent of identified topics in 2005, but over forty in 2006. 
The three ‘crime’ categories account for a majority of reports in 2005 (57 per cent) 
and 2006 (68 per cent) but hardly register in 2007 (five per cent), when most 
statements focus on reductions in EUFOR numbers.  
Table 1. EUFOR Contributions to Joint Press Conferences 2005-2007 
 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Briefings attended/contributed to 43/25 33/12 28/15 104/52 
EUFOR deployment, command and senior visits 6 0 11 17 
Organised crime, terrorism, drugs and police 
support 11 2 0 13 
Weapons harvest, seizure or destruction 3 7 1 11 
Other 4 1 5 10 
Persons Indicted for War Crimes 7 2 0 9 
Domestic military 3 3 1 7 
Charitable, public and reconstruction activities 3 1 1 5 
The predominance of crime topics in 2005 and 2006 might suggest that EUFOR 
sought to legitimate their presence through their role in tackling crime in line with H1. 
However, a closer reading of the documents shows that crime risks are not at the 
forefront of how EUFOR present their activities. Rather than linking them to 
 10 
organised or violent crime, EUFOR often describe illegally held weapons targeted in 
‘harvesting’ operations as ‘life threatening hazards’ or the likely source of accidents if 
discovered by children (17 October 2006, 7 and 28 November 2006). Moreover, 
where crime and victimisation are contested, basing legitimacy on action against 
crime and criminals is precarious. In contrast, operations to find and arrest PIFWCs 
are presented as being under the leadership of local authorities. When a EUFOR 
spokesperson responded to a press question with a blunt assessment of domestic 
activity against PIFWCs, comparing arrests as ‘NATO 29 – Republika Srpska 0’, he 
swiftly reemphasised that international forces were there to support domestic 
authorities:  
Sorry, and obviously the other point for you to bear in mind of course is that 
the onus for capturing the war criminals lies with the Bosnian and 
Herzegovina authorities, in particular [Republika Srpska]. You know, we're 
here in a supportive role. 
(8 March 2005, see also 11 October 2005) 
EUFOR has not sought to legitimate their presence in BiH through their framing of 
the problem of crime. Other sources are used, including a broader concept of public 
safety, while the locally contested understanding of PIFWCs illustrates that action 
targeting particular criminals risks undermining legitimacy. A European Commission 
employee also suggested that EU agencies would be aware of various audiences in 
terms of securing legitimacy, speculating over likely negative responses from the UK 
press to EU funded soldiers pursuing illegal loggers in BiH (Interview a).  
		
Crime risks are mobilised in the Commission’s work supporting BiH’s aspirations 
towards EU membership, particularly regarding a push for consolidated policing in 
BiH under a state-level ministry and associated constitutional changes ([AUTHOR] 
2011: chapter 4). The following quotations illustrate the type of risks highlighted:  
Drug traffickers have exploited BiH's (now less) porous borders, divided legal 
jurisdictions and weak customs controls. They have used BiH mainly as a 
country of transit to Western Europe. (Commission of the European 
Communities 2003: 3.6.4) 
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… if BiH is not able to tackle crime effectively, that has a bearing on crime 
elsewhere in Europe, including within the EU… the current policing structure 
is not effective in combating those sorts of crime prone to cross borders and 
spread throughout Europe. (Chris Patten, letter to PRC, 2004, Reproduced in 
PRC 2005: Appendix 2) 
… criminals are using the cracks in the policing management system to 
smuggle drugs, guns and people through BiH into the EU. We have the same 
reports on the explosions and gang killings across BiH and the increasing 
presence of drugs testify to the danger this represents both to Europe’s cities 
and to BiH’s citizens. (Javier Solana, in Numanovi 2004) 
Solana goes on to say that resolving these issues requires constitutional change when 
he notes that the Police Restructuring Commission (PRC) should not ‘hide behind the 
current constitution’ and that if need be they should recommend amendments to the 
constitution, representing a chance for BiH to ‘break free from political restraints’.  
The proposed solution to these crime risks, as much risks to the EU as to BiH, is a 
unified structure of policing under a state-level ministry. This contentious aim was 
supported by OHR through a radio and television campaign and public meetings 
throughout the summer of 2005 (OHR 2005). Were this simply a matter of more 
effective policing, it might be described as governing crime. What creates the 
possibility that this is a manifestation of governing through crime is the linking of 
crime fighting capacity to larger questions of the structure of the Bosnian state. 
Indeed, an OHR spokesperson was clear that the reform was a matter of 
differentiating the state from the entities:  
It’s [policing] at the heart of what the state’s for. State and entity are two 
different things, and this is what Paddy’s [the High Representative] been 
trying to get across. (Interview b) 
The example suggests the legitimating power of acting against crime is used to 
support the contentious end of centralisation (H2, G2). Yet this interpretation relies on 
isolating substantive and structural goals. As the quotation below, from a manager at 
the EC delegation in BiH, shows, it is possible to pursue a substantive anti-crime goal 
and a structural project of institutional realignment simultaneously. Untangling and 
isolating the multiple ends in any governing act, or linked series of governing acts, to 
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suggest that one is the true objective is neither easy nor reflective of a governing 
actor’s complex motivations:  
From the Commission’s point of view, we need a single interlocutor; I mean, 
for ourselves… [we] would never want to sit around the same table with the 
entities or the Cantons. We want a single person who we know can commit 
the country… as the situation stands now, we know that the Minister of 
Security is not in a position legally to commit the country… we feel that this 
fragmentation of competence when it comes to law enforcement actually 
hampers the police, and as you know there is a ‘spill over effect’ when it 
comes to organised crime… So these would be primarily the two reasons: one 
institutional/practical, if you wish, and the second substantial in terms of 
efficiency of the structures in the country. (Interview c) 
In criminal justice, as elsewhere, the Commission seeks coherent state structures 
which allow a particular form of interaction with potential member states (G3). As 
noted in an analysis of penal reform in BiH, the relationship of state-level government 
to entities and cantons blocks the translation of international obligations into action at 
the competent level of government ([AUTHOR] 2010: 87). Simultaneously, the 
structural fragmentation underlying this problem is seen as creating inefficiencies, 
blocking effective action against crime. In public discourse, the second substantive 
element is emphasised over the former structural one, suggesting that substantive 
crime-related justifications better convince particular audiences. This may be taken as 
evidence of governing through crime, but could equally suggest that governing actors 
prefer to present their activities in terms of substantive objectives, whether crime-
related or otherwise.  
So far I have presented explicitly crime-focused activities of the EU. Next, I examine 
EU activities in other policy sectors for evidence of a focus on crime risks. This is 
done in two stages: firstly, by examining the Commission’s study on BiH’s 
preparedness for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (Commission of the 
European Communities 2003); secondly by looking at Commission reviews of sectors 
of policy where crime risks are credible, it is possible to see if the EU focuses on 
those risks at the expense of others.  
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The 2003 study on BiH’s readiness to embark on a Stability and Association 
Agreement (SAA) followed a ‘Road Map’ produced in 2000 outlining the steps 
preceding eventual SAA negotiations. The Road Map covered 18 priorities across 
three fields derived from the Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership: political, 
economic, and democracy, human rights and rule of law (European Union 2000). 
Criminal justice reform features in the Road Map, through calls for the 
implementation of a law on the State Border Service and the implementation of laws 
on judicial, prosecutorial and court services. The 2003 study (Commission of the 
European Communities 2003) follows the Road Map and Copenhagen Criteria in 
handling political and economic readiness and the readiness of the country to meet the 
responsibilities arising from an SAA. The latter covers eight headings and a general 
evaluation, including obligations in the field of Justice and Home Affairs which 
occupy around a fifth of the section7. Nonetheless, this remains limited to one 
subsection, and the imperatives for reform, reconstruction and restructuring elsewhere 
in the report are most frequently put in economic terms, reflecting the EU’s origins as 
an economic community (see also Baker 2010).  
		
The EU also conducted or commissioned a series of reviews of policy sectors in BiH, 
including agriculture, education, the environment, health, justice, police, and refugee 
returns. Outside those sectors directly concerned with criminal justice, there is a case 
for exploring EU mobilisation of a number of crime risks in the field of return of 
refugees and displaced persons (e.g. corruption, ethno-political bias and intimidation 
preventing returns)8, and in the environmental sector in the form of illegal logging. 
Yet neither of the relevant reviews raise the issue of crime (Agriconsulting 2005; FRR 
Team 2005).  
Thus, while there is some evidence that crime risks are mobilised in support of a 
controversial programme of institutional realignment, it is not clear whether this is 
due to the legitimating factor of crime or the perceived merits of substantive over 
institutional goals in communicating particular policy programmes (contra H2). 
Moreover, as might be expected given the relatively slight section of the Union acquis 
handling criminal justice matters, EU activities in BiH cover a spectrum of policy 
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sectors, and risks from crime and criminality are not a strong focal point in these 
(again, contra H1).  
#	(%%	%	
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This section presents evidence of OHR marshalling the legitimating potential of 
acting against crime in the areas of military restructuring, privatisation and taxation, 
suggesting opportunistic use of crime threats in governing. It then moves on to 
dismissals of public officials under the Bonn powers, in light of Simon’s discussion of 
punitive techniques in the workplace (2007: chapter 8). I argue that to characterise 
these as governing through crime highlights problems at the limits of the interpretive 
framework. 
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The ‘thin roof’ of post-war state-level government in BiH did not extend to defence 
and each entity retained its own armed forces. The Constitution (GFAP 1995: annex 
4) handles defence in a slightly muddy fashion. Article 3.1 lists state-level 
responsibilities and excludes defence. All areas not listed in 3.1 are reserved for the 
entities by article 3.3(1). Yet outlining the role of the three member state-level 
Presidency, it states:  
Each member of the Presidency shall, by virtue of the office, have civilian 
command over armed forces.  (Article 5.5a) 
In the context of the Presidency, each member representing one of three main 
constituent peoples of BiH, command rests with ‘each member’, not the collective 
body, and control is over ‘armed forces’, not the armed forces9. The two armies 
remained under entity control, with further fragmentation in FBiH. The armed forces 
have since been unified under a state-level Ministry, part of a progressive thickening 
of the central state. Two incidents suggest that the controversial restructuring 
programme to bring the entity armies under state-level control (as per G2) sought 
legitimacy from tackling crime: The Orao Affair and revelations of Army of 
Republika Srpska (VRS) support to Ratko Mladi.  
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In October 2002, a NATO raid on an RS government-controlled armaments firm, 
Orao, found they had provided parts and assistance to Iraq, contravening a UN 
embargo. Paddy Ashdown, High Representative at that time, later wrote:  
We knew at once that this would give us the opportunity I had been looking 
for to try to push through defence reform in order to abolish the two opposing 
entity armies and create a single entity army under state control…   
… On 29 October I flew to Brussels to see George Robertson [Secretary 
General of NATO]… to tell him that I intended to use this scandal to initiate a 
complete reform of the defence structures in Bosnia… He agreed and issued 
some strong statements about the seriousness of the Orao affair. (2007: 248-
250) 
Speaking before the EU Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic 
Council, Ashdown is less explicit about planned reforms, highlighting strengthened 
civilian control of the army and a state-level Committee on Military Matters (OHR 
2002). Publicly, the plan to abolish the entity armies was played down. Ashdown 
describes the reform as a slow process, held up by his reluctance to remove Mirko 
Šarovi, President of RS, for fear of generating ill will among predominantly Serb-
parties and their supporters. President Šarovi was ultimately convinced of the 
benefits of resigning rather than being removed10 and a Defence Reform Commission 
was subsequently established in May 2003 by Ashdown, who refers explicitly to the 
Orao affair in his justificatory preamble. The decision cites the Peace Implementation 
Committee’s call, in relation to Orao, for, ‘appropriate measures, taking into 
consideration the issues of systemic reform and political responsibility… essential to 
prevent such a situation occurring again’ (OHR 2003). The principles informing the 
commission’s initial mandate maintain entity oversight, but seek to secure command 
and control at state-level. There is no appeal to a victim as such here, rather to BiH’s 
damaged reputation, and the crime is not one of violence, at least in the most 
immediate sense.  
Subsequently, in November 2004, military files were published indicating that Ratko 
Maldi, indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY), was 
employed by VRS until 2002, when he was officially discharged by Mirko Šarovi. 
Further revelations pointed towards continued VRS support for Mladi, including the 
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provision of shelter at military facilities, contravening domestic criminal law and 
constitutional obligations. OHR condemned the ‘systematic connivance of high-
ranking members of the RS military’ and noted that measures to tackle such 
systematic deficiencies were under consideration (OHR 2004a). According to 
Ashdown, this was used to ‘strengthen and accelerate state control of the armed 
services’ (Ashdown 2007: 294).  
The events were closely followed by an extension of the commission’s mandate to 
develop legislation to transfer competencies from entity-level ministries of defence to 
common institutions (OHR 2004c). The two crimes of illegal trading in military 
equipment and expertise, and assisting a PIFWIC, were not the only driving force 
behind military integration. Possible NATO membership and commitments arising 
from OSCE membership are important factors. Nonetheless, the two moments when 
existing military structures could be linked to criminality saw the restructuring agenda 
pushed forward through OHR decisions. The example supports a hypothesis of 
governing, in part, through crime, but the capacity to tie other governing objectives to 
crime fighting (as per H2) is simply one tool among others, employed here in an 
opportunistic fashion.  
Similar evidence of the opportunistic use of crime risks to pursue wider objectives can 
be seen in proposed state-level structures for VAT and customs and the privatisation 
of state-owned utilities. Ashdown reports finding ‘a network of corruption even wider 
and deeper than [he] had imagined’ in an audit of state utility firms, but ‘wanted to 
drop this bombshell at the best time for maximum effect in the context of our 
struggles with the Republika Srpska on VAT and Customs’ (Ashdown 2007: 266, 
emphasis added). He goes on:  
We used this report… to insist on the removal of corrupt managers and the 
cleaning-up of the system, so weakening the nationalist political structures in 
the area, accelerating the process of creating a single state framework for 
electricity generation in Bosnia and moving this towards privatisation. Indeed, 
these audits gave us crucial leverage to push forward the whole process of 
economic reform at a faster pace… pushing privatisation across the whole 
economy. (Ashdown 2007: 274) 
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In the penultimate chapter of Governing through Crime, Simon analyses governance 
in the workplace. The controversial use of Bonn powers to dismiss officials mirrors 
the use of dismissal as a punitive management technique (2007: 236). Following PIC 
endorsement of the Bonn powers (PIC 1997: XI, 2), Pero Raguž was removed from 
mayoral office in Stolac in March 1998 (OHR 1998). Since then, Bonn powers have 
been used to remove or suspend over 170 individuals from public, elected or party 
political office, accounting for around 28 per cent of all decisions made by OHR11. 
Often this has involved accusations of corruption, although as Dorn notes this is rarely 
accompanied by criminal or civil proceedings (2010: 296, 300-301). Most recent 
emphasis has been on rehabilitating those banned from public office, although powers 
of removal were used in 2008 and 2009 (OHR 2008, 2009a, 2009b). Removals impact 
all levels of political life in BiH from municipal housing offices to state presidency 
and have covered civil servants, elected politicians and managers in public enterprises 
(Ebner 2004). Removals peaked in 2004, when 75 individuals were removed from 
office within the space of a few days, mainly on account of evidence held by OHR 
regarding support for Radovan Karadži.  
Locating dismissals as an aspect of governing through crime depends on interpreting 
these actions in terms of S3 and H3, whereby the logic of a criminal justice paradigm 
is employed in other contexts. Simon describes the growth of dismissal as the 
‘ultimate sanction’ (2007: 234) as a ‘penal’ element in the governance of American 
labour, accompanied by workplace surveillance to detect illegal behaviour, 
managerial concern with the risk from potentially violent employees, and the use of 
civil law remedies in ways which ‘closely parallel criminal law’ (2007: 236-38). OHR 
dismissals lack this broader context, leaving punitive aspects of the decisions as the 
only link to the framework of governing through crime. These should not be 
minimised. The decision to remove has been accompanied with a bar on holding any 
public, political or elected office until lifted by the High Representative (for example, 
OHR 2008). While recognising that dismissal from a job can be interpreted as 
punitive, this is not sufficient evidence of criminal justice logics defining the High 
Representative’s relationship with public officials in BiH as anticipated by H3. The 
solid foundation for assessing the intention behind the act as punitive is absent, for 
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example, from the Decision to remove Predrag erani, which was justified in terms 
of prevention rather than punishment (OHR 2008). Criminal justice employs range of 
strategies beyond the punitive, and so showing the colonisation of other areas of 
governing by criminal justice logics and metaphors could draw on any of a diverse 
range operating within the field, whether rehabilitative, incapacitative, restorative, 
deterrent or punitive. Without clearer specification, this third aspect of governing 
through crime leaves the framework open to stretching. The reductive aspect to 
governing through crime strategies whereby the focus falls on the primarily punitive 
elements ‘most connected to its [i.e. crime control’s] core meanings’ (Jonathan 
Simon, personal correspondence, 8 March 2011) is implicit in Simon’s book and 
demands more explicit attention and explanation. 
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Applying an adapted framework of governing through crime to international agencies 
in BiH has produced findings which are largely negative. The EU does not widely 
deploy crime risks to legitimate its activities in BiH and there are credible alternative 
interpretations where the EU uses substantive goals to justify structural change. 
Where the High Representative uses evidence of criminality to support contentious 
goals, this appears opportunistic, rather than systematic, and is employed alongside 
other tools including membership obligations, incentives and the use of Commissions 
sitting outside the normal domestic political structures. The opportunistic use of crime 
emerges in a context of general challenges to OHR legitimacy which are less relevant 
to the EU (e.g. Knaus and Martin 2003)12 and more specific resistance to actions 
which threaten the autonomy of the entities and the resources of political parties.  
Placing the nature of the crimes identified, opportunistically, by the High 
Representative alongside the violent crime, with which Simon’s analysis begins, and 
from the unambiguous suffering suggested by Boutellier, Braithwiate or Pratt, 
suggests that an observed tendency to slip beyond this analytical boundary (Simon 
2007; Baker 2010) is damaging. Violent crime supports a strong image of a victim 
and the translation of this victim into the symbolic idealised citizen. This underpins 
the claim to legitimacy for actions which claim to serve victims or to prevent further 
victimisation. This can be contrasted to a vaguely defined victim, in the case of the 
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BiH’s reputation in the Orao affair, or the non-specific victim of corruption. Even 
where the High Representative focuses on crimes linked to serious violence, where 
physical harm is unambiguous, the parallel with Simon’s work is not straightforward. 
The focus on VRS support for Ratko Mladi links to the crime of assisting a PIFWC 
and the crimes of violence committed during the 1992-95 war, most notably in 
Srebrenica. There is no attempt to claim legitimacy for military integration through 
preventing future victimisation. Secondly, were a historical victim sought to provide 
legitimation the impact would vary across different audiences. The High 
Representative’s use of the Mladi case may be examined in relation to audiences 
composed of the different communities within and beyond BiH. In Republika Srpska, 
a previous RS government report acknowledging killings at Srebrenica was 
subsequently questioned; an initial Serbian parliamentary resolution which 
condemned those killings has in turn been criticised in RS (Arslangic 2010, OHR 
2010, SE Times 31 March and 1 April 2010). Victimhood is not universally 
recognised, and as noted earlier EUFOR were cautious in conveying their own role in 
arresting PIFWCs. This need not discount the case as an example of governing 
through crime, in line with H2, rather the target may be governments outside BiH 
upon whose continued support, material and non-material, the High Representative 
depends. Thus specific examples of governing through crime need to be understood 
clearly in terms of whose behaviour is being governed and whose perception of 
legitimacy is targeted.  
The array of logics and techniques of governing employed in criminal justice provide 
a range of models and metaphors, not necessarily unique to the field. If no technique 
is intrinsically and uniquely attached to criminal justice, accounts of the deployment 
of logics of governing associated with criminal justice institutions as examples of 
governing through crime are untenable. While it may be possible to draw legitimacy 
through an apparent pursuit of crime fighting and crime reduction (S1 and S2, above), 
precise analytical application that part of Governing through Crime which posits the 
bleeding of metaphors and techniques to other sectors (S3) requires further 
specification regarding the tendency to reduce criminal justice to a punitive core. This 
is most credible where that punitive core is established as the dominant criminal 
justice narrative, and suggests limits to where the framework can be applied.  
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The limited evidence of governing through crime in BiH suggests a wider range of 
governing techniques and logics are employed by international actors. Operating with 
a ‘penologist’s microscopic lens’ (Savelsberg 2008: 1146) can limit the visibility of 
these, much as Boswell’s critique of securitization studies in the field of migration 
identifies the risk that a narrowly defined analytical focus will ‘constrain the 
observation of alternative trajectories’ in how issues are framed (2007: 592). In the 
opportunistic examples of crime and criminality mobilised in support of governing 
objectives, there is neither a focus on violent crime nor an attempt to generate or 
capitalise on a culture of fear and control. Democracy in BiH faces many challenges, 
not least those arising from the concentration of executive power in, and limited 
accountability of, OHR (Chandler 2000; Knaus and Martin 2003, Dorn 2009). On the 
basis of the evidence presented here, these challenges are not supplemented to any 
extent by the distortions of democracy generated by a politically generated and 
sustained culture of fear.  
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